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STATUTES, GAPS, AND VALUES IN TORT LAW
ROBERT E. KEETON*
Note: The Journal of Air Law & Commerce is proud to publish
the first annual Roy Robert Ray Lecture, delivered by Dean Robert
E. Keeton to the Southern Methodist University School of Law.
Dean Keeton's thoughts on problems of statutory construction in
torts cases should be of great interest to persons involved in vari-
ous areas of the law, including the heavily regulated field of avia-
tion. The question of availability of punitive damages for wrongful
death can, of course, be of crucial importance in aviation litigation.
See, most notably, In Re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 427
F. Supp. 701 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (holding that denial of punitive dam-
ages for wrongful death under California law would constitute a
deprivation of equal protection of the laws).
-The Editors
I.
A T THE beginning of the 20th Century, and still at mid-
century, tort law was overwhelmingly common law-law
made in the courts through the common law process of case-by-
case decisional development. In occasional instances a controlling
rule was fixed by statute, as in survival acts and wrongful death
acts abrogating, among other rules, that rule of the common law
under which death of the injured person terminated all rights of
recovery for tortious bodily injuries. Also, statutes proscribing con-
duct and fixing criminal penalties occasionally had an impact on
tort actions, through negligence per se doctrine or in some other
way. All the occasional instances together, however, add up to a
small percentage of tort litigation. This was the picture in 1900,
and in 1950 as well.
* Langdell Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Harvard University School
of Law. p yright©@ Robert E. Keeton and SMU School of Law
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What will a picture of the relative impact on tort law of judicial
decisions and statutes be likely to show in the year 2000?
One difference will be a marked increase in the number and
scope of enactments explicitly directed at changing tort law. The
increase has been substantial in the decades of the 1960's and
1970's, and unfulfilled demands for law reform through legislation
have grown even more rapidly. Also, the demands have become
more diversified. Contrary to the earlier tendencies of tort law "re-
forms" to expand liabilities and compensation, "reform" proposals
of the 1970's are as likely to aim for reduced liabilities and cost
control as to aim for better protection of victims. Thus, the activists
range across the spectrum of political, social, and economic phi-
losophy, and their numbers increase. It seems reasonable, then, to
expect that the number and scope of statutes bearing on tort law
will continue to increase. This foreseeable development is good rea-
son for tort lawyers, teachers, and judges to examine with renewed
intensity the many issues of legal process that emerge when statutes
and judicial decisions are interwoven to produce a single, compre-
hensive tort law.
How, if at all, will foreseeable increases in the number and scope
of relevant statutes affect judicial responsibility in tort cases?
Although the present article does not directly undertake an assess-
ment of the potential impact on the workload of the courts, the
particular implications of increased legislation that are examined
here provide scarcely any basis for inferring that these new statutes
will reduce that workload. These developments will, however, cause
a shift of emphasis-a change in the nature of the issues presented
in tort cases in the courts. Already, in the decades of the 1960's
and 1970's, we have observed a shift toward increasingly frequent
-or at least less infrequent-focus on problems concerning the
judicial role in lawmaking, as well as the substantive law issues
at stake in the case at hand. As statutes increase in number and
scope, it seems likely that courts will more often address, directly
and openly, issues of legal process that interact with the substantive
law issues at stake.
The present article considers key issues of legal process incident
to the presence of gaps in statutes. No statute answers all ques-
tions in the area it affects. All statutes have gaps. How do and
should courts act in relation to statutory gaps?
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II.
As a basic case for testing ideas that may be suggested, assume
the following facts.' A 12-year-old boy alighted from the rear door
of a bus operated by Defendant Bus Company. When barely out of
the bus he realized that he was at the wrong stop. He tried to re-
enter the closing rear door; his foot was caught in the door with
his body outside. The bus driver, disregarding protests of passen-
gers who observed the boy's predicament, started the bus in motion.
The boy fell under the wheels and was killed.
Assume that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that
the bus driver's conduct was willful or wanton in relation to the
12-year-old boy.
Assume, second, that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a find-
ing that the driver acted as he did because of a threat of discipline
if he failed to adhere to his schedule. The Defendant Bus Com-
pany had been severely criticized because its buses had not operated
on schedule. Responding to this criticism, the management had
issued an order to drivers: "If you have trouble with slow and un-
cooperative passengers, close the doors and move on. You are per-
sonally responsible if you don't make your schedule."
i.
How would you answer these questions about what the sub-
stantive law should be?
Question One. On evidence such as is assumed in the case stated
above, should the jury be allowed to return a verdict of punitive
damages against the Bus Company?
Question Two. Should the law regarding punitive damages
against the Bus Company be the same in a case in which the boy
was severely injured and survived as in a case in which he was
killed?
Question Three. Should the law regarding punitive damages
against the Bus Company be the same in a case in which the
"Adapted from Mattyasovsky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 Ill. 2d 31,
330 N.E.2d 509 (1973). I have taken some liberties in stating assumptions
here, with the result that this hypothetical case may be distinguished from
Mattyasovszky. In particular, I ask the reader to assume a case in which clearly
punitive damages would have been allowable against the Bus Company if the
boy had lived. One may infer that on the record in Mattyasovszky the majority
of the Court would not have described that case in this way. See Part VII, infra.
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alighting passenger was a very elderly person, survived by adult
sons and daughters, as in a case in which the alighting passenger
was a boy, survived by his parents?
If you are uncomfortable about answering any of these questions
without more information, or more time for reflection, or both,
you are asked just to answer on the basis of which way you lean,
and only then to look at the footnote below for information about
how others have answered.!
IV.
The three questions stated immediately above are value ques,
tions. Although you might have consciously or subconsciously
made some assumptions about a legal context, you might instead
have taken the questions as pure value questions, free of the con-
straints of a particular legal context. In contrast, if you are con-
fronted with any of these questions within a legal context, you are
never free to answer simply on the basis of a personal preference
for what the substantive law should be. If you are a judge, you must
take account of statutes and constitutional provisions, among other
sources of direction and guidance. If you are a legislator, you must
take account of constitutional constraints. Even if you are voting
on a proposed constitutional provision, as a citizen or as a mem-
ber of a constitutional convention, you may be constrained by at-
tachment to the principle that questions like these three ought not
to be answered in the constitution but instead should be left to
legislatures or to courts.
V.
Moving to one of the more complex questions confronted when
we consider these three questions in a specific legal context, let us
first assume a legal context unlike that in Texas but like that in
many other states.
In addition to the assumptions stated in Part II, assume, third,
that this incident occurred in a state where a wrongful death act
and a survival act were first enacted, respectively, in 1853 and
2 Members of the audience for the lecture in which these questions were
stated were rather closely divided on the first question, though a majority an-
swered YES. All persons responding answered YES to the second question, and
all but two answered YES to the third.
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1872. The wrongful death act authorizes recovery of "pecuniary
harm" sustained by survivors of a person whose death was caused
by the wrongful act or neglect of another. The survival act pro-
vides for the survival of "actions to recover damages for an in-
jury to the person (except slander and libel), and actions to recover
damages for an injury to real or personal property or for the
detention or conversion of personal property." Common law rules
terminating rights of recovery at death were in effect in this juris-
diction before these statutes were enacted.
Assume, fourth, that judicial decisions of the state rendered be-
fore 1850 had allowed recovery of punitive damages for willful or
wanton wrong of the defendant.
Assume, fifth, that decisions of the 20th century have repeatedly
allowed damages against the master, as well as the servant, for the
willful or wanton wrong of the servant, committed in the scope of
employment, causing personal injury.
Question Four. Are the boy's parents, in an action against the
Bus Company, entitled to an instruction to the jury that upon
specified findings they may award punitive damages against the
Bus Company in addition to other damages allowable under the
survival act and the wrongful death act?
At a time when neither the wrongful death act nor the survival
act had been enacted, the plaintiffs in facts otherwise like the hypo-
thetical case would not have been able to recover punitive dam-
ages; they had no cause of action at all.
How would you frame the issue about punitive damages in a case
that arises after the legislature has acted? Would you ask: [1] Does
either of the statutes authorize an award of punitive damages in
cases such as this?
Or, would you ask: [2] Do judicial precedents# authorize an
award of punitive damages in cases such as this?
Or, would you ask: [3] Does either of the statutes or any ju-
dicial precedent either authorize or forbid punitive damages in
cases such as this, and, if not, what answer should now be given?
Or would you frame the issue in a way different from any of
these?
Here, as in other contexts, if you are allowed to state the issue
in the way you choose, you may exert a strong influence toward
the outcome you prefer.
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The first way of framing the issue points toward a conclusion
that punitive damages are not allowable when the victim has died.
Neither statute says anything explicitly about punitive damages.
Both statutes explicitly authorize recovery of damages for stated
elements of harm. Thus, it can be said that the only explicit authori-
zation is for compensatory damages.
Is the second way of framing the issue, if not clearly conducive
to allowing punitive damages, at least less conducive to denying
them? One may not fairly say that there was precedent for allow-
ing punitive damages for a willful or wanton wrong causing death,
since no such award had ever been approved. But one may say,
more generally, that judicial precedents had sustained awards of
punitive damages for willful or wanton wrongs. True, before the
statutes were enacted, this rule had never been applied after death
of the victim, but that outcome was due to another rule that denied
any recovery whatsoever after death of the victim. That obstacle
was removed by enactment of the statutes. The statutes neither
forbade nor authorized punitive damages.
The third way of stating the question is more nearly neutral.
Trying still to be neutral, and observing the body of law, statutes
and decisions to which a judge faced with the hypothetical case
might look for direction and guidance, we might formulate a
fourth way of framing the issue: [4] Given the enactment of the
survival and wrongful death acts, given both the explicit terms and
the general nature of the provisions on damages appearing in
those acts, and given the precedents allowing punitive damages for
willful or wanton wrongs not causing death, what direction or
guidance does a judge have with respect to allowance of punitive
damages for willful or wanton wrongs causing death?
If stating the issue in the form of question [4] seems loaded one
way or the other, probably it seems so primarily by comparison
with one of the first two, or with other formulations of the issue
you might imagine. A second way in which it may seem loaded is
that you may have a clear view how you would answer question
[4], and you therefore find it pointing you to that outcome. But
that will be true even of a neutral way of stating the issue, as
applied to a case that, in your view, rather clearly should be de-
cided one way or the other. In that instance, perhaps it is your
1978] STATUTES, GAPS, VALUES IN TORT LAW 7
view of the case rather than the formulation of the issue that is
weighted one way or the other.
I submit that formulations [3] and [4] are, if not neutral, at
least more nearly neutral than the first two. One reason this is so
is that they are less likely to lead to a decision on unstated premises.
The first way of stating the issue (Does either of the statutes
authorize an award of punitive damages?), unless accompanied
by a warning that this is only a sub-issue and not the whole issue,
is an invitation to accept the unstated premise that when a statute
addresses some area of law anything within that area that it does
not authorize is forbidden. This is, of course, error as egregious as,
and rather closely analogous to, that illustrated by the graffiti
placed on the schoolroom blackboard underneath the notice of
things forbidden: "Everything not forbidden is compulsory." It is
the error of the undistributed middle-the gap.
VI.
Every statute has gaps; it answers some questions, but not others.
We need a theory about judging in the context of statutes that
candidly takes account of this inescapable fact. It is helpful, I
submit, to use a theory that is summarized in the following visual
analogies and guidelines for how a court should proceed when a
statute is cited and urged as controlling:'
A. VISUAL ANALOGIES TO DISTINCTIONS




Infinite gaps; Many gaps; Few gaps; No gaps;
unlimited choice wide choice narrow choice no choiceSI I
a These visual analogies and suggested guidelines are adapted from a memo-
randum prepared for the Federal Appellate Judges Conference in Phoenix, Ari-
zona, October 29, 1976, based upon views stated in R. KEETON, VENTURING TO
Do JUSTICE 94-95 (1969). Cf. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 805-07,
1413-17 (Tent. ed. 1958). See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 487 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.), and materials collected in R. ALDISERT, THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 170-235 (1976).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
2. Statutory Directive
Very general; Very specific;
Unlimited choice wide choice narrow choice No choiceI j I
3. Statutory Purpose
Very unclear; Very clear;
Unlimited choice wide choice narrow choice No choiceI I 1 1
4. What is in the Statute Bearing on the Issue at Hand?
Nothing; Wide Narrow A complete answer;
unlimited choice choice choice no choiceI I I I
Each of the visual analogies is a continuum. The first analogy
pictures the outside limits and key points in between. No valid
statute has infinite gaps; it does answer some questions, at least.
Every statute has some gaps; it does not answer all questions.
Between these outside limits is a spectrum of degrees ranging from
almost unlimited choice through wide choice and through narrow
choice to almost no choice.
It is not a matter of choice but of necessity that a court fills
any gap that must be filled to decide the case at hand. In filling
the gap by necessity, however, the court is also by necessity exer-
cising a choice about how to fill the gap. To conclude that the court
has no choice on an issue is to conclude that there is no gap as to
that issue.
The fourth visual analogy makes the point that judicial applica-
tion of a statute is not limited to determining either (a) that a
statute has no bearing on, the issue or (b) that it completely answers
the issue. These are only the polar possibilities.
Similarly, visual analogies 2 and 3 make the point that an in-
quiry into the nature of a statutory directive or statutory purpose
is not necessarily destined to end in a determination either (a)
that the statutory directive is so specific and precise, or the statutory
purpose is so clear, that it determines an issue or (b) that the
statutory directive is so general, or the statutory purpose is so un-
clear, that it is of no use in deciding the issue. These are only the
polar possibilities.
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The courts' role in cases involving the polar possibilities may be
quite different from its role in all the cases between the poles.
B. SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR COURTS
1. If the statute addressed the issue at hand and answered it,
apply the mandate of the statute (absent unconstitutionality).
2. If the issue at hand is one beyond that core area of issues that
the statute addressed and answered, defer to the statute's manifes-
tations of principle and policy as far as they can be ascertained
and are relevant to the issue at hand.
3. Subject to the first two propositions, aim for resolving the
issue at hand so as to produce the best total set of rules, including
those within the core area of the statute and other cognate rules
of law, whatever their source. Defer to the statute's manifestations
of principle and policy, as far as they can be ascertained. Accept
the inapplicable statutory mandate as a datum. Accept other statu-
tory directives and judicial precedents as data. Aim for a decision
on this issue that will produce an even-handed system for this issue
and all the cognate issues that are answered in statutes and other
precedents.
4. In determining whether a statute addressed the issue at hand,
dispense with contrary-to-fact presumptions about the legislative
process; be realistic and be candid. Use legislative history as data;
avoid proceeding as if legislative history were a statutory mandate.
At most, declarations in legislative history are obiter dicta of the
legislative process. If it is necessary to resort to legislative history,
paragraphs 2 and 3 apply, not paragraph 1. Also, do not treat
failure to enact a mandate as if it were enacting a mandate. "Not
speaking" to an issue is not "speaking" to that issue. Rarely,
failure to enact legislation is a significant datum, and paragraphs
2 and 3 then apply. But never is it a mandate as in paragraph 1.
C. SUGGESTED OBJECTIVES FOR COURTS
Even though a legislature can act on a problem and its range of
potential solutions is broader than that available to courts, never-
theless, when the legislature has not acted (and thus there is no
controlling statute), the court should aim for the best solution
still available in this context of legislative failure to answer the
problem.
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VII.
Return, now, to the question stated in Part V. Are the parents
entitled to an instruction allowing an award of punitive damages
in the hypothetical case?
Applying the guidelines suggested in Part VI, I would classify
this case as one not within the core mandate of either statute.
Neither statute addresses this issue. Both statutes, however, mani-
fest principles and policies that are relevant.
First, both statutes clearly manifest a policy against treating
death as an event conclusive against tort liability. Taking this
policy as a guideline, the court should treat the statute as in this
respect weighing in favor of rather than against a ruling permitting
punitive damages in actions involving death of a person injured
by tortious conduct.
Second, however, both statutes clearly manifest a policy favor-
ing somewhat limited liability-a policy of caution in opening up
a new area of legal accountability. Survival acts have been generally
understood as limiting the period for which damages are recover-
able to the lifetime of the decedent. The survival act assumed in
the hypothetical case, like many of those enacted, is surely not
explicit on this point, but it seems clear that courts so construing
survival acts have thought they were following a manifested statu-
tory guideline in this respect. The assumed wrongful death act, like
most of those enacted, more explicitly manifests a policy of limiting
the scope of damages since the only explicit authorization is for
damages for "pecuniary harm" sustained by survivors of the person
whose death was caused by the wrongful act or neglect of the
defendant. Although this wrongful death act (like many others)
does not say anything explicitly about punitive damages, the mani-
festation of a policy in favor of liability more limited than that of
the usual measures of damages in tort actions for injury to person
weighs against an allowance of any damages other than those ex-
plicitly authorized.
Available information about the legislative history of enact-
ments in the states in the 19th century is generally scant, and at best,
like all other legislative history, it supports inferences not about
statutory mandates but instead about manifestations of principle
and policy as the obiter dicta of the legislative process. The history
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of more recent unsuccessful efforts to modify survival and wrong-
ful death acts is at most a history of failure to achieve sufficient
support for the legislature to speak. Ordinarily the range of poten-
tially applicable explanations for a legislature's not speaking, apart
from considered views on a particular issue at stake in litigation,
is quite extensive, and efforts to extract considered manifestations
of principle and policy are highly speculative at best. Thus, even
if we assumed some typical kind of legislative history attending
the 19th century enactments and some more recent legislative his-
tory of aborted proposals for statutory amendments, we would be
left with inconclusive statutory guidelines for decision of the puni-
tive damages question, even with respect to the principal actor-
the bus driver. The issues become still more complex in relation
to the liability of the bus company and the insurers of the liability
of the driver and the company.
Absence of a statutory mandate regarding punitive damages
compels the court to look to other sources of guidance. One of
those sources is judicial precedent in cases in which one or both
of the survival and wrongful death acts were invoked. If recorded
precedents reveal no instance in which punitive damages have
been awarded for more than a century of survival and wrongful
death actions, it may reasonably be asserted, in language borrowed
from the Illinois court's opinion in Mattyasovszky, that the statutes
have "never been thought to authorize the award of punitive dam-
ages" and that a contention that they "should now be construed to
do so" is a prayer for "a change in the law of this State which
for more than a hundred years has limited recovery under the
Survival Act [and the Wrongful Death Act] to compensatory dam-
ages."' Note the subtle progression from lack of authorization in
the statute to prohibition in the law as a construction of the statute.
This line of thought is often supplemented by an assertion (with
which I disagree) 6 that a court is less free to overrule a decision
construing a statute (even, though the construction is by necessity
judicial handiwork) than to overrule judicial precedents generally.
+ Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 Ill. 2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509 (1973).
The quoted phrases are taken from the majority opinion's discussion of the
Survival Act in Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 Ill. 2d 31, 33, 330
N.E.2d 509, 510 (1973).
'See R. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE 78-80 (1969).
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It may happen, of course, that there is an absence of judicial
precedent as well as statutory mandate. The dissenting opinion
in Mattyasovszky asserts that at most the only judicial expression
in point was a dictum in 1868, in a case not involving a verdict
awarding punitive damages--an expression that was not cited
until more than a century later as authority for the proposition
that punitive damages may not be recovered in an action for
wrongful death!
Whatever the dicta or holdings may be, in any event they are ex-
pressions of courts, not the legislature. They are not statutory man-
dates but instead judicial actions with respect to gaps in the statutes.
Moreover, decisions of the 1970's, including Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc.' and Gaudette v. Webb,' have called attention
to the possibility of another kind of gap. Survival and wrongful
death acts were enacted by legislatures to allow limited recoveries
despite common law precedents against any recovery after death
of either the tortfeasor or the victim. They did not explicitly
mandate that the courts should not overrule the common; law prece-
dents and recognize a new common law action, as well as the statu-
tory actions. If the courts should choose to take that step, they
might authorize punitive damages as well as compensatory damages.
It does not follow, however, that the court would be writing on
a slate as clean as if the legislature had never acted. Even if there
is no statutory mandate prohibiting judicial recognition of the new
cause of action, clearly there are relevant statutory manifestations
that a court should take into account as it considers the competing
arguments of principle and policy bearing upon this issue-an
issue that, by hypothesis, the statutes did not address. Also, there
are powerful policy arguments, concerned with evenhandedness
and clarity of the law, against creating multiple causes of action
and allowing punitive damages in the court-created cause of action
after death of the victim while denying punitive damages in statu-
tory causes of action applicable to the same facts.
This analysis leads to the conclusions, first, that in relation to
claims for punitive damages there are gaps in the statutory man-
dates-gaps that by necessity the courts must fill when the issues
761 Ill. 2d at 39, 330 N.E.2d at 513.
8398 U.S. 375 (1970).
1362 Mass. 60, 284 N.E.2d 222 (1972).
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are presented for decision-and, second, that the manifestations
of principle and policy bearing upon claims for punitive damages,
though constraining in some degree, nevertheless leave considerable
scope for choice by the courts. In preparing to discharge this re-
sponsibility for principled choice, the courts should aim for re-
solving the issue at hand so as to produce the best total set of
rules, including those expressed within the core area of the survival
and wrongful death acts and other cognate rules of law, whatever
their source. In relation to this issue of awards of punitive dam-
ages after death of a tort victim, among those cognate rules, and
the principles and policies upon which they are based, are all those
precedents, principles and policies bearing upon punitive damages,
first against primary actors such as the bus driver, second, against
vicariously liable employers such as the bus company and, third,
against liability insurers of primary actors and their employers. In
Mattyasovszky, a case in which the facts may have been less sup-
portive of a punitive damages claim than those we have assumed
in our hypothetical case, the majority opinion declines to "change
the law" and allow punitive damages. After adverting to com-
peting policy considerations bearing upon awards of punitive dam-
ages, the majority opinion observes:
Serious questions inevitably arise in a case like the present, in
which the driver of the bus, whose conduct was primarily respon-
sible for the injury, is no longer a party defendant because he was
dismissed by the plaintiff before the case went to the jury.
It is apparent, we think, that the strong equitable considerations
that were present in the Moragne and Gaudette cases are lacking
in the case before us .... 10
One way of reading this opinion is that the court is satisfied
with, or at least acquiesces in, a set of cognate rules under which
punitive damages will be available if the victim survives but not if,
on facts otherwise identical, the victim dies. This reading brings
the opinion into conflict with views reported earlier in this article
about whether the law regarding punitive damages should be the
same in death and injury cases.11 Another way of reading the
opinion is that the court has reservations about whether it should
approve punitive damages on, facts like these, whether or not the
10 61 I11. 2d at 37, 330 N.E.2d at 512.
11 See Part III, n.2, supra.
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victim dies, and is not prepared to "change the law" to do so in this
case in which the victim has died; it may be more likely to "change
the law" instead, if indeed any change is required, to deny punitive
damages in a case like this except that the victim survives.
The hypothetical case stated above (in Parts II and V) might
be viewed as distinguishable from Mattyasovszky. One difference,
related to the preceding discussion, is the omission of any history
of judicial pronouncements, whether holding or dicta, about allow-
ing punitive damages in actions after death of the victim. A second
difference is the assumption, in the hypothetical, that decisions of
the 20th century have repeatedly allowed punitive damages against
master and servant for willful or wanton wrong causing personal
injury. A third difference is the assumption, in the hypothetical,
that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that the bus
driver's conduct was willful or wanton in relation to the 12-year-
old boy.
Thus, Mattyasovszky itself might be distinguished. In relation
to the assumed hypothetical, however, I submit that in making
its choices to fill statutory gaps a court should reject any set of
rules that denies punitive damages after death but allows punitive
damages on facts that are identical except that the injured victim
survives. The usefulness of awards of punitive damages is a matter
of substantial controversy-and the more so in relation to vicarious
liability and insurer liability than in relation to the liability of the
primary actor." But, in the company of others apparently, " I am
12 Policy arguments for punitive damages tend to lose some of their force
when applied to hold a "master" vicariously accountable for the conduct of a
"servant," and still more when applied in a context in which the payment is made
by a liability insurer. Also, practical problems of the extent of availability and
use of liability insurance deserve attention. In the 1970's liability insurers have
manifested increasing concern about claims for punitive damages. The Insurance
Services Office, a service organization for the liability insurance industry, issued
a recommended form for a policy provision excluding coverage for punitive and
exemplary damages. See, e.g., The Standard, THE NORTHEAST'S INSURANCE WEEK-
LY, Feb. 10, 1978, at 1, 25. This recommendation received only limited acceptance
among major liability insurers and state insurance regulators. Predictably it cre-
ated great concern among insureds who happened to be informed of the develop-
ment, among brokers, and within the Risk and Insurance Management Society.
Id. (One of the less obvious reasons for concern is that punitive damages claims
may create significant conflicts of interest between insurer and insured even when
the insured has coverage for punitive as well as compensatory damages; the likeli-
hood of significant conflicts of interest markedly increases if there is coverage for
compensatory but not for punitive damages.) In March, 1978, the Insurance
Services Office withdrew its proposed policy provision excluding coverage for
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unable to identify any substantive policy argument for denying puni-
tive damages against a tortfeasor who kills the victim while, by hy-
pothesis, allowing punitive damages on facts identical except that
the victim survives. Whatever policy reasons one may find for
limitations on the scope of awards for punitive damages have no
special weight in survival and wrongful death actions; indeed, if
a difference were to be decreed, it would seem that it should cut
just the other way-toward punishment in cases in which the victim
has died. Certainly criminal law-another source of cognate rules
regarding punishment-when distinguishing cases in which the
victim dies, treats homicide as a basis for greater rather than
lesser punishment.
It may be that all, or at least some, of the members of the court
who joined in the majority opinion in Mattyasovszky would have
rejected death of the victim as a critical factor in allowing puni-
tive damages if they had thought that issue was squarely presented
for decision. My criticism of the majority opinion is that it would
have been better to be more candid and clear. Even this rather mild
criticism is tempered, however, by recognition that efforts at clari-
fication might have so divided the court that it would have been
impossible to write an opinion explaining the outcome on, clearly
articulated grounds supported in common by a majority of the
court. The policy arguments for clarity and candor in judicial
opinions apply even in such cases, I submit, but they are surely
less forceful when clarity and candor disclose only lack of guidance
rather than guidance for the future.
VIII.
Real-world fact situations can be even more complex than ordi-
nary law school hypotheticals. We began the present inquiry with
a hypothetical adapted from the Mattyasovszky case, which was
before the Supreme Court of Illinois in 1973. Now consider some
elements of complexity added by an Illinois statute.
Section 77 of the Illinois Public Utilities Act " grants "to the
punitive damages and instead urged legislative reform of the law relating to
punitive damages. The Standard, THE NORTHEAST'S INSURANCE WEEKLY, March
31, 1978, at 1, 19.
1" See Part III, n.2 supra.
14 ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 111%Y, § 77 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).
16 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [44
persons... affected" by a willful violation of that act a cause of
action for punitive damages. In Churchill v. Norfolk & Western
Ry. Co."s the majority of an intermediate appellate court in Illinois
held that Section 77 creates "an independent cause of action-
neither derivative nor engrafted upon the Wrongful Death or Sur-
vival Act."1 The dissenting judge joined the majority in certifying
to the supreme court that the case is sufficiently important to de-
serve consideration by the higher court,'" and that is where the
matter stands as this article goes to press.
The Illinois Public Utilities Act makes no statement explicitly
about survival and death actions. The court's statement that the
Public Utilities Act created a cause of action is, of course, the
court's conclusion, not a reason. It is the court's choice about how
to fill a gap in the statute expressed, however, in the traditional way
of speaking, as if the statute had included a mandate on this specific
point-as if the legislature had made the choice. Surely it makes
sense for the same rule to apply in death actions based on Section
77 as in personal injury actions based on Section 77. The reason,
however, is not that the statute says so. Rather, the best reason is
one that applies to other injury and death actions as well as to
those based on Section 77-the basic objectives of punitive dam-
ages apply with at least as great force in death actions as in per-
sonal injury actions.
IX.
Assume, now, that the hypothetical case stated in Part II arises
in the legal context not of the more common form of wrongful
death act, described in Part V, but instead in the more distinctive
context of a Texas-style set of constitutional and statutory provi-
sions.
Article XVI, Section 26, of the Constitution of the State of
Texas provides that "[elvery person, corporation, or company,
that may commit a homicide, through wilful act, or omission., or
gross neglect, shall be responsible in exemplary damages, to the
" 46 Ill. App. 3d 781, 362 N.E.2d 356 (4th Dist. 1977). See also National
Bank of Bloomington v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 46 I1. App. 3d 757, 362 N.E.2d
369 (4th Dist. 1977).
16 Id.
" 46 Ill. App. 3d at 794, 362 N.E.2d at 366.
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surviving husband, widow, heirs of his or her body, or such of
them as there may be, .. ." Article 4671 of the Texas civil statutese8
provides for wrongful death actions. Article 4673 continues:
"[w]hen the death is caused by the wilful act or omission, or gross
negligence of the defendant, exemplary as well as actual damages
may be recovered.""' Article 4675 adds that "[a]ctions for damage
arising from death shall be for the sole and exclusive benefit of
and may be brought by the surviving husband, wife, children, and
parents of the person whose death has been caused or by either
of them for the benefit of all. . . ."" Observe that parents are listed
in this statute, though omitted from the constitutional listing of
protected persons.
Question: In Texas, can the parents recover exemplary damages
for death of their child by "homicide" committed by willful act,
or omission, or gross neglect of the bus driver? Would the answer
be the same if adult sons and daughters were seeking exemplary
damages for death of their aged parent?
Certainly the constitution mandates that adult sons and daugh-
ters be entitled in appropriate circumstances to recover exemplary
damages for the death of their parent. Does it mandate that parents
be excluded from those entitled to recover exemplary damages for
the death of a child? Or does it leave that question unanswered?
I submit that a candid and fair reading of the constitutional pro-
vision compels the conclusion that it does not answer the ques-
tion. To infer that anything not authorized was forbidden is to
fall into the error of the undistributed middle.
If the question was not answered by the constitution, is it an-
swered by Articles 4673 and 4675, or is it unanswered there as
well, leaving a gap to be filled by courts? This is a more difficult
question.
Article 4675 lists parents as well as "children.""' If this does not
mandate the same entitlement in parents as in children it surely
helps to negate any argument that the statutes disqualify parents.
"
8 TEX. STAT. ANN. Art. 4671 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
'+ Id., Art. 4673.
20 Id., Art. 4675.
21 Probably "children" should be read as including adult sons and daughters
at least, and perhaps grandchildren as well. Any ambiguity in this respect, how-
ever, bears little if any relevance to the present inquiry.
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This article, however, speaks of actions for "damage," and one
might read it as not applying to exemplary damages." Article 4673,
on the other hand, explicitly authorizes exemplary damages but
does not itself say who may recover. Perhaps one may make a re-
spectable argument that the two articles together declare an entitle-
ment for parents to be treated, as well as children, as claimants to
exemplary damages, but it seems more likely that these two articles
were not consciously designed to answer this question. A judge
who takes the view recommended here is, in effect, concluding
that this question is beyond the core mandate of the statute; under
the guidelines suggested in Part VI, the question must be answered
by the court, giving deference to principles and policies manifested
in these constitutional and statutory provisions but looking also to
other sources for guidance.
The present hypothetical problem differs from the actual prob-
lem confronting Texas courts because of the omission from the
hypothetical of the history of these constitutional and stautory pro-
visions and the history of judicial precedents that preceded and
followed their enactment.' This paper does not explore the com-
peting arguments that may be drawn from that history. I do sub-
mit one point, however, that should be considered as those com-
peting arguments are evaluated. To attribute to the constitution
or to the statutes a distinction-between the treatment of claims of
exemplary damages by parents for the death of their child and
claims of exemplary damages by sons and daughters for the death
of their parent-in the face of a rather overwhelming consensus
that we cannot find adequate policy justification for the distinc-
tion,' is a strikingly curious way of manifesting deference and re-
2 "Damage" is often used to mean harm, in contrast with "damages" in the
sense of an allowable award of money. Thus, "damage" might be read as mean-
ing that Article 4675, supra note 20, concerns actions for compensatory damages
for harm, and not actions for exemplary damages. Surely one must have some
unease, however, about drawing the inference that "damage" was used so pre-
cisely in this statute and with this consequence in view.
21 See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. Wells, 123 Tex. 151, 70 S.W.2d 409, 410
(1934); Winnt v. International & G.N. Ry. Co., 74 Tex. 32, 11 S.W. 907 (1889);
Houston & T. C. Ry. v. Baker, 57 Tex. 419 (1882); Houston & T. C. Ry. v. Cow-
ser, 57 Tex. 293 (1882); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Scoggins v. Southwestern Elec. Serv. Co., 434
S.W 2d 376 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Fleming Oil Co. v.
Watts, 193 S.W.2d 979 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
"See the expressions reported in Part III, n.2, supra.
1978] STATUTES, GAPS, VALUES IN TORT LAW 19
spect for the constitutional electorate and the legislature. Would
it not be more respectful to infer that they did not address this ques-
tion but instead left it as a gap in the constitutional and statutory
mandates to be filled by courts? And if some judges have in the
past acted on the premise that they were bound to assume a con-
stitutional or legislative answer, is it not time to reexamine that
premise? There are, after all, relevant manifestations of principle
and policy in our constitutions, both state and federal, in equal pro-
tection clauses. Distinctions that cannot be adequately explained
on some policy ground surely violate the spirit at least, and per-
haps the letter, of equal protection. A constitution, of all docu-
ments, should be interpreted as aiming for compliance with its
own injunction of equal protection. It seems appropriate, too, that
courts, in answering questions left to them, should be aiming not
merely for the minimal evenhandedness and fairness among differ-
ent persons that equal protection clauses demand, but for the more
substantial adherence to evenhandedness and fairness that courts
are free to achieve in their own doctrine.
X.
In preceding parts of this article it has been asserted, first, that
survival and wrongful death acts and, when they exist, constitu-
tional provisions bearing on death actions, like all other constitu-
tional and statutory provisions have gaps; second, that filling gaps
requires judicial choice; third, that in filling gaps the courts should
aim for resolving the issue at hand so as to provide the best total
set of rules, including those within the core area of the relevant
constitutional and statutory provisions and other cognate rules of
law, whatever their source; and fourth, that in, doing so, the courts
should weigh considerations of principle and policy underlying the
various rules, as well as the rules themselves. Perhaps a fifth point
is implicit in the fourth, but in any event it deserves explicit atten-
tion: choices are inevitably value-laden. It is better, I submit, to
acknowledge this fact openly and to develop theories and methods
for guiding and appropriately limiting these expressions of value
than to pretend that judicial choices can be value-free.
The range of choice is not unfettered. Judges are not free to
express their own personal values. The obligation of principled
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adjudication implies principles that are acceptable more generally
than to individuals or even to the group serving as judges at the
time and place of decision. It implies an obligation on the part of
judges to be guided by the manifestations of principle and policy
in authoritative sources-chiefly constitutions, statutes' and judicial
precedents. Even if those manifestations are incomplete and im-
perfect, they nevertheless offer substantial guidance. Indeed, the
guidance is so compelling that it dictates results in most cases.
The law would lack essential certainty-for which, of course,
there is compelling support in policy-if this were not so. In those
less common cases-the kind that law teachers so often choose to
use in casebooks, articles, and lectures-openly acknowledging that
courts are engaged in making value-laden choices will contribute
to a sharper focus on the policy issues and, in the end, wiser
choices. Even though value choices, they also may and should be
reasoned choices. When policy choices are thus openly debated,
the reasoning in which we engage is not primarily deductive reason-
ing from assumed authoritative premises-the kind of reasoning in
which choice is made first, in the election of authoritative premises,
and only then is reason used to derive the outcomes that were im-
plicit in the premises. Instead, the reasoning is primarily informa-
tive reasoning-the kind in which reason is used to develop the
implications of alternative sets of premises and choice is deferred
until it can be informed by a view of the whole array of alternative
sets of premises and their consequences.'
When courts are engaged in the inevitable enterprise of filling
gaps in statutes, the value choices they make as, legitimate repre-
sentatives of society will be wiser as they are better informed by
advocacy addressed explicitly to the competing principles, policies,
and values at stake and as they are openly explained in judicial
opinions.
Perhaps one who undertakes to evaluate the value choices of
others-as we all do when we criticize judicial decisions-should
be willing at least to decide the hypothetical case presented for
discussion. I do not claim that there is only one "right" or "logical"
answer to the hypothetical case stated in Part II. Indeed, the thesis
I For a more extended statement of this point, see Entitlement and Obligation,
46 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 8-10, 42-43 (1977).
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is instead that policy choices are involved and logic alone cannot
direct those choices. I do submit, however, that the policy argu-
ments that can be brought to bear upon this hypothetical case weigh
heavily in favor of an affirmative answer-the court should approve
an instruction allowing punitive damages upon supportable find-
ings of willful or wanton wrong and a relationship appropriate to
vicarious liability. Among the sources of support for these policy
arguments are the statutory manifestations of a policy against treat-
ing death as an event conclusive against tort liability. This is not
the end of the inquiry; in a particular legal context one must take
account of the history of all the relevant enactments and the
judicial precedents. That history should be read, however, in the
spirit of the fourth guideline suggested in Part VI-with a realistic
and candid view of the legislative process and without contrary-to-
fact presumptions that fall into the error of the undistributed mid-
dle. It seems likely that in most legal contexts this spirit of exami-
ning sources of guidance will lead to the conclusion that only if the
court is prepared to reexamine and overturn the precedents allow-
ing punitive damages in like cases involving personal injury rather
than death should it deny punitive damages here. For the moment
at least-though for how long may be in doubt-it seems unlikely
that a judge so inclined would be able to marshal a majority for
overturning the well entrenched rule of allowing punitive damages
in personal injury actions generally.

